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ABSTRACT
Selection of the preferred classical set of states in the process of decoherence
– so important for cosmological considerations – is discussed with an emphasis
on the role of information loss and entropy. Persistence of correlations between
the observables of two systems (for instance, a record and a state of a system
evolved from the initial conditions described by that record) in the presence of
the environment is used to define classical behavior. From the viewpoint of an
observer (or any system capable of maintaining records) predictability is a measure
of such persistence. Predictability sieve – a procedure which employs both the
statistical and algorithmic entropies to systematically explore all of the Hilbert
space of an open system in order to eliminate the majority of the unpredictable
and non-classical states and to locate the islands of predictability including the
preferred pointer basis is proposed. Predictably evolving states of decohering
systems along with the time-ordered sequences of records of their evolution define
the effectively classical branches of the universal wavefunction in the context of
the “Many Worlds Interpretation”. The relation between the consistent histories
approach and the preferred basis is considered. It is demonstrated that histories
of sequences of events corresponding to projections onto the states of the pointer
basis are consistent.
1. Introduction
The content of this paper is not a transcript of my presentation given in course of
the meeting: Proceedings contributions rarely are. However, in the case of this paper
the difference between them may be greater than usual. The reason for the discrepancy
is simple. Much of what I said is already contained in papers (see, for example, my
recent Physics Today article (Zurek 1991) and references therein). While it would be
reasonably easy to produce a “conference version” of this contribution, such an exercise
would be of little use in the present context. Nevertheless, I have decided to include in the
first part of this paper much of the same introductory material already familiar to these
interested in decoherence and in the problem of transition from quantum to classical, but
with emphasis on issues which are often glossed over in the available literature on the
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subject, and which were covered in the introductory part of my presentation in a manner
more closely resembling (Zurek 1991). The second part of the paper ventures into more
advanced issues which considered only briefly during the talk, but are the real focus of
attention here. In a sense, the present paper, while it is self-contained, may be also regarded
by reader as a “commentary” on the material discussed in the earlier publications. Its union
with my 1991 paper would be a more faithful record of my conference presentation, and a
familiarity with that publication – while not absolutely essential – could prove helpful.
Decoherence is a process which – through the interaction of the system with external
degrees of freedom often referred to as the environment – singles out a preferred set of
states sometimes called the pointer basis. This emergence of the preferred basis occurs
through the “negative selection” process (environment-induced superselection) which, in
effect, precludes all but a small subset of the conceivable states in the Hilbert space of
the system from behaving in an effectively classical, predictable manner. Here I intend to
expand and enhance these past discussions in several directions:
( i) I shall emphasize the relation between the interpretational problems of quan-
tum theory and the existence, within the Universe, of the distinct entities usually
referred to as “systems”. Their presence, I will argue, is indispensable for the
formulation of the demand of classicality. This will justify a similar split of the
Universe into the degrees of freedom which are of direct interest to the observer
– a “system of interest” – and the remaining degrees of freedom known as the en-
vironment. It is therefore not too surprising that the problem (in particular, the
measurement problem, but also, more generally, the problem of the emergence of
classicality within the quantum Universe) which cannot be posed without recog-
nizing systems cannot be solved without acknowledging that they exist.
( ii) I shall discuss the motivation for the concept of the preferred set of “classical”
states in the Hilbert space of an open system – the pointer basis – and show
how it can be objectively implemented by recognizing the role of the interaction
between the system and the environment. It will be noted that what matters is
not a unique definition of the absolutely preferred set of states, but, rather, a
criterion for eliminating the vast majority of the “wrong”, nonclassical states.
( iii) I shall consider the relation between the states which habitually diagonalize
(or nearly diagonalize) the density matrix of an open system – states which can
be found on or near the diagonal after a decoherence time has elapsed irregardless
of what was the initial state – and the preferred states. It will be pointed out
that diagonality alone is only a symptom – and not a cause – of the effective
classicality of the preferred states. And, as all symptoms, it has to be used with
caution in diagnosing its origin: Causes of diagonality may, on occasion, differ
from those relevant for the dynamics of the process of decoherence (for example,
“accidental” diagonality in any basis may be a result of complete ignorance of an
observer) and the quantum to classical transition that decoherence precipitates.
( iv) Therefore, I shall regard the ability to preserve correlations between the
records maintained by the observer and the evolved observables of open sys-
tems as a defining feature of the preferred set of the to-be-classical states, and
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generalize it to the situations where the observer is not present. This definition,
employed already in the early discussions of effective classicality (Zurek, 1981),
can be formulated in terms of information-theoretic measures of the persistence
of correlations, which leads one in turn to consider the role of predictability in the
definition of the preferred basis.
( v) I shall analyse the relation of the decoherence approach with the consistent
histories interpretation. In particular, I shall show that the histories expressed
in terms of the events corresponding to the projections onto the pointer basis
states are consistent. Thus, a succesful decoherence resulting in a stable pointer
basis implies consistency. By contrast, consistency alone does not constrain the
histories enough to eliminate even very non-classical branches of the state vector.
Moreover, consistency conditions single out not only the initial moment in which
all the histories begin, but also the final time instant on on a more or less equal
footing. Furthermore, in the absence of a fixed set of pointer projectors, consistent
histories cannot be expressed in terms of a “global” set of alternative events, which
could be then used for all histories at a certain instant of time, but, rather, must
be formulated in terms of “local” events which are themselves dependent on the
past events in the history of the system, and which do not apply to all of the
alternatives coexisting at a certain instant. Unless the records are a part of the
physical Universe, this is bound to introduce an additional element of subjectivity
into the consistent histories interpretation.
( vi) When decoherence is succesful and does yield a preferred basis, the branches
of the universal wavefunction can thus be traced out by investigating sequences
of preferred, predictable sets of states singled out by the environment - induced
superselection. In this setting the issue of the “collapse of the wavepacket” –
formulated as a question of accessibility, through the existing records of the past
events and the ability to use such records to predict a future course of events –
is posed and discussed.
I shall “iterate” these themes throughout the course of the paper, returning to most
of them more than once. Consequently, the paper shall cover the issues listed above only
approximately in the order in which they were itemized in this introduction. Sections 2 –
5 cover the familiar ground but do it with a new emphasis. Sections 6 – 10 venture into a
new territory and should be of particular interest to these working on the subject.
2. Motivation for Classicality, or “No Systems - No Problem”
The measurement problem – the most prominent example of the interpretational diffi-
culties one is faced with when dealing with the quantum – disappears when the apparatus
- system combination is regarded as a single indivisible quantum object. The same is true
not just in course of measurements, but in general – the problems with the correspondence
between quantum physics and the familiar everyday classical reality cannot be even posed
when we refuse to acknowledge the division of the Universe into separate entities.
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The reason for this crucial remark is simple. The Schro¨dinger equation;
ih¯
d
dt
|Φ >= H|Φ > , (2.1)
is deterministic. Therefore, given the initial state, it predicts, with certainty, the subse-
quent evolution of the state vector of any really isolated entity, including the joint state of
the apparatus interacting with the measured system. Thus, in accord with Eq. (2.1), the
initial state vector;
|ΦAS(0) > = |A0 > |φ0 > = |A0 >
∑
i
ai|σi > , (2.2)
evolves into |ΦAS(t) > in the combined Hilbert space HAS . There is no hint of the
interpretational problems in this statement until one recognizes that the expected outcome
of the measurement corresponds to a state which – while it contains the correlation between
A and S – also acknowledges the “right” of the apparatus to “a state of its own”. By
contrast, a typical form of |ΦAS(t) > is;
|ΦAS(t) >= Σiai|Ai > |σi > , (2.3)
where more than one ai(t) are non-zero. Above, {|Ai >} and {|σi >} belong to separate
Hilbert spaces of the apparatus and of the system, HA and HS , such that
HAS = HA ⊗HS . (2.4)
Let me emphasize at this point the distinction between quantum and classical mea-
surements by adopting a somewhat Dirac - like notation to discuss the classical analog of
a measurement - like evolution. The initial states of the system S and of the apparatus A
can be denoted by |s0} and |A0}. When these states are “pure” (completely known), and
the evolution is classical, the final result of the measurement-like co-evolution is another
“pure” state: Reversible evolutions preserve purity in both quantum and classical context,
but with a final state which is simpler classically than for a typical quantum case:
|ΥASt } = |At}|st} . (2.5)
The key difference between Eq. (2.3) and Eq. (2.5) is the absence of the superposition
of the multiple alternatives corresponding to the possible outcomes. And even when the
classical initial states are known incompletely (as is usually the case in the measurement
situations) the initial state of the system is
∑
pi|si} , (2.6)
where pi are the probabilities of the various states. The final state of the interacting objects
must be also described by a classical probability distribution
∑
i
pi|Υ
AS
i } =
∑
i
pi|Ai}|si} . (2.7)
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Nevertheless, and in contrast with the quantum case, the range of the final states – pointer
positions of the apparatus – will continuously narrow down as the range of the initial states
of the system is being restricted. This simultaneous constriction of the uncertainty about
the initial state of the system and about the outcome – the final state of the apparatus –
shall be referred to below as the complete information limit.
Its consequence – the expectation that a complete knowledge of the state of a classical
system implies an unlimited ability to predict an outcome of every conceivable measure-
ment – is the cornerstone of our classical intuition. This expectation is violated by quantum
theory: Complete information limit in the sense described above does not exist in the quan-
tum case. There, even in the case of the complete information about each of the two objects
(i.e., the system and the apparatus) separately, one is still typically forced into a situation
represented by Eq. (2.3) in which – following the measurement – neither the apparatus
nor the system have “a state of their own”. Indeed, for every pure state of the quantum
system there exists a corresponding “relative” state of the apparatus (see Everett, 1957).
In fact, a correlation between the states of the apparatus and a measured system is, at this
stage, analogous to the nonseparable correlation between the two particles in the Einstein
- Podolsky - Rosen “paradox” (Zurek, 1981).
A closely related symptom of the quantum nature arises from the superposition prin-
ciple. That is, pure quantum states can be combined into another pure state. There is no
equivalent way of combining pure classical states. The only situation when their combina-
tions are considered is inevitably tied to probability distributions and a loss of information.
Thus, formally, classical states denoted above by |·} correspond not to the vectors in the
Hilbert space of the system, but, rather, to the appropriate projection operators, i. e.:
|·} ⇐⇒ |· >< ·| (2.8)
Such projection operators can be combined into probability distributions in both quantum
and classical cases. A pure classical state – a point in the phase space – is of course an
extreme but convenient idealization. A more realistic and useful concept corresponding to
a probability distribution – a patch in the phase space – would be then described by the
density matrix with the form given by Eq. (2.6).
In a “hybrid” notation the measurement carried out by a classical apparatus on a
quantum system would then involve a transition:
|A0}|φ0 >< φ0| =⇒
∑
i
pi|Ai}|σi >< σi| (2.9)
The difference between Eq. (2.3) and the right hand side of Eq. (2.9) is clear: Classicality
of the apparatus prevents the combined object from existing in a superposition of states.
The need for a random “reduction of the state vector” arises as a result of the demand
– based on the desire to reconcile consequences of Eq. (2.1) (i.e., the linear superposition,
Eq. (2.3)) with the expectation based on the familiar experience (expressed above by Eqs.
(2.5), (2.7) and (2.9)) that only one of the outcomes should actually happen (or, at least,
appear to happen) in the “real world.”
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There is, of course, a special set of circumstances in which the above distinction be-
tween quantum and classical disappears, and no reduction of the state vector following
the interaction is required. This unusual situation arises when – already before the mea-
surement – the to-be-measured quantum system was in an eigenstate (say, |σk >) or in a
mixture of the eigenstates of the measured observable. In the case of a single pure state
the resulting state of the apparatus - system pair following the interaction between them
is given by Eq. (2.3), but with only one non-zero coefficient, |ai|
2 = δik. Hence, the
distinction between Eq. (2.3) and Eq. (2.5) disappears. An obvious generalization of this
effectively classical case for a mixture results in an appropriate probability distribution
over the possible outcomes of the measurement. Then the correlation between the sys-
tem and the apparatus has a purely classical character. Consequently, this situation is
operationally indistinguishable from the case when a classical system in a state initially
unknown to the observer is measured by a classical apparatus.
These considerations motivate the decoherence approach – an attempt to resolve the
apparent conflict between predictions of the Schro¨dinger equation and perception of the
classical reality. If the operationally significant difference between the quantum and classi-
cal characteristics of the observables can be made to continuously disappear, then maybe
the macroscopic objects we encounter are “maintained” in the appropriate mixtures by
the dynamical evolution of the quantum Universe. Moreover, one can show that purely
unitary evolution of an isolated system can never accomplish this goal. Therefore, it is
natural to enquire whether one can accomplish it by “opening” the system and allowing
it to interact with the environment. The study of this and related questions defines the
decoherence approach to the transition between quantum and classical.
3. Operational Goals of Decoherence
The criterion for success of the decoherence programme must be purely operational.
The Schro¨dinger equation and the superposition principle are at its foundation. One
must concede at the outset that they will not be violated in principle. Therefore, the
appearance of the violation will have its origin in the fact that the records made and
accessed by observers are subject to limitations, since they are governed by quantum laws
with specific – rather than arbitrary – interactions and since their records are not isolated
from the environment. One important criterion – to be discussed in more detail in the
next section – refers to the fact that idealized classical measurements do not change the
state of the classical system. That is, for example, a complete information limit – the
classically motivated idea that one can keep acquiring information without changing the
state of the measured object – should be an excellent approximation in the “everyday”
classical context. The recognition of the role of decoherence and the environment allows
one to show how this can be the case in a quantum Universe.
An objection to the above programme is sometimes heard that – in essence – the
Universe as a whole is still a single entity with no “outside” environment, and, therefore,
any resolution involving its division into systems is unacceptable. While I am convinced
that much needs to be done in order to understand what constitutes a “system”, I have also
little doubt that the key aspects of the resolution proposed here are largely independent
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of the details of the answer to this question. As we have argued in the previous section,
without the assumption of a preexisting division of the Universe into individual systems
the requirement that they have a right to their own states cannot be even formulated:
The state of a perfectly isolated fragment of the Universe – or, for that matter, of the
quantum Universe as a whole – would evolve forever deterministically in accord with Eq.
(2.1). The issue of the “classicality” of its individual components – systems – cannot be
even posed. The effectively stochastic aspect of the quantum evolution (the “reduction
of the state vector”) is needed only to restore the right of a macroscopic (but ultimately
quantum) system to be in its own state.
Quantum theory allows one to consider the wave function of the Universe. However,
entities existing within the quantum Universe – in particular us, the observers – are ob-
viously incapable of measuring that wave function “from the outside”. Thus, the only
sensible subject of considerations aimed at the interpretation of quantum theory – that is,
at establishing correspondence between the quantum formalism and the events perceived
by us – is the relation between the universal state vector and the states of memory (records)
of somewhat special systems – such as observers – which are, of necessity, perceiving that
Universe from within. It is the inability to appreciate the consequences of this rather
simple but fundamental observation that has led to such desperate measures as the search
for an alternative to quantum physics. One of the goals of this paper is to convince the
reader that such desperate steps are unwarranted.
One might be concerned that the appeal to systems and a frequent mention of measure-
ment in the above paragraphs heralds considerations with a character which is subjective
and may be even inexcusably “anthropocentric”, so that the conclusions could not apply to
places devoid of observers or to epochs in the prehistory of the Universe. A few remarks on
this subject are in order. The rules we shall arrive at to determine the classical preferred
basis will refer only to the basic physical ingredients of the model (that is, systems, their
states, and the hamiltonians that generate their evolution) and we shall employ nothing
but unitary evolution. These rules will apply wherever these basic ingredients are present,
regardless of whether an observer is there to reap the benefits of the emerging classicality.
Thus, the role of “an observer” will be very limited: It will supply little more than a
motivation for considering the question of classicality.
Having said all of the above, one must also admit that there may be circumstances
in which some of the ingredients appropriate for the Universe we are familiar with may
be difficult or even impossible to find. For example, in the early Universe it might be
difficult to separate out time (and, hence, to talk about evolution). While such difficulties
have to be acknowledged their importance should not be exaggerated: The state vector of
the Universe will evolve in precisely the same way irregardless of whether we know what
observables could have been considered as “effectively classical” in such circumstances.
Therefore, later on in course of its evolution, when one can define time and discern the
other ingredients relevant for the definition of classicality, the question of whether they
have been present early on or what was or was not classical “at the time when there was
no time” will have absolutely no observable consequences.
This last remark deserves one additional caveat: It is conceivable (and has been
7
even suggested, for example by Penrose (1989)) that the quantum theory which must
be applied to the Universe as a whole will differ from the quantum mechanics we have
become accustomed to in some fundamental manner (that is, for instance, by violating the
principle of superposition for phenomena involving gravitation in an essential way). While,
at present, there is no way to settle this question, one can nevertheless convincingly argue
that the coupling with the gravitational degrees of freedom is simply too weak in many of
the situations involving ordinary, everyday quantum to classical transitions (for example,
the blackening of a grain of photographic emulsion caused by a single photon) to play a
role in the emergence of the classicality of everyday experience.
4. Insensitivity to Measurements and Classical Reality.
The most conspicuous feature of quantum systems is their sensitivity to measurements.
Measurement of a quantum system automatically results in a preparation: It forces the
system into one of the eigenstates of the measured observable, which, from that instant on,
acts as a new initial condition. The idealized version of this quantum “fact of life” is known
as the projection postulate. This feature of quantum systems has probably contributed
more than anything else to the perception of a conflict between the objective reality of the
states of classical objects and the elusive subjective nature of quantum states which – it
would appear – can be molded into a nearly arbitrary form depending solely on the way in
which they are being measured. Moreover, the Schro¨dinger equation will typically evolve
the system from the prepared initial state (which is usually simple) into a complicated
superposition of eigenstates of the initially measured observables. This is especially true
when an interaction between several systems is involved. Then the initial state prepared
by a typical measurement involves certain properties of each of the separately measured
systems, but quantum evolution results in quantum correlations – in states which are
qualitatively similar to the one given by Eq. (2.3). Thus, when the measurement of the
same set of observables is repeated, a new “reduction of the wavepacket” and a consequent
restarting of the Schro¨dinger evolution with the new initial condition is necessary.
By contrast, evolutions of classical systems are – in our experience – independent of
the measurements we, the observers, carry out. A measurement can, of course, increase
our knowledge of the state of the system – and, thus, increase our ability to predict its
future behavior – but it should have no effect on the state of the classical system per se.
This expectation is based on a simple fact: Predictions made for a classical system on
the basis of the past measurements are not (or, at least, need not be) invalidated by an
intermediate measurement. In classical physics, there is no need to reinitialize evolution,
a measurement does not lead to the preparation, only to an update of the records. This
insensitivity to measurements appears to be a defining feature of the classical domain.
For a quantum system complete insensitivity to measurements will occur only under
special circumstances – when the density matrix of the system commutes with the measured
observable already before the measurement was carried out. In general, the state of the
system will be influenced to some degree by the measurements. To quantify the degree to
which the state of the system is altered by the measurement one can compare its density
matrix before and after the measurement (idealized here in the way introduced by von
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Neumann (1932)):
ρafter =
∑
i
PiρbeforePi (4.1)
The projection operators Pi correspond to the various possible outcomes. A generalization
to the situation when a sequence of measurements is carried out is straightforward:
ρafter =
∑
i,j,...,n
Pn . . . PjPiρbeforePiPj . . . Pn (4.2)
Above, pairs of projection operators will correspond to distinct observables measured at
consecutive instants of time. Evolution inbetween the measurements could be also incor-
porated into this discussion.
It is assumed above that even though the measurements have happened, their results
are not accessible. Therefore, the statistical entropy;
h(ρ) = −Trρ ln ρ (4.3)
can only increase;
h(ρafter) ≥ h(ρbefore) . (4.4)
The size of this increase can be used as a measure of the sensitivity to a measurement.
Unfortunately, it is not an objective measure: It depends on how much was known about
the system initially. For example, if the initial state is completely unknown so that ρbefore ∼
1, there can be no increase of entropy. It is therefore useful to constrain the problem
somewhat by assuming, for example, that the initial entropy h(ρbefore) is fixed and smaller
than the maximal entropy. We shall pursue this strategy below, in course of the discussion
of the predictability in section 6.
The role of decoherence is to force macroscopic systems into mixtures of states –
approximate eigenstates of the same set of effectively classical observables. Density ma-
trices of this form will be then insensitive to measurements of these observables (that is,
ρafter ≈ ρbefore). Such measurements will be effectively classical in the sense described near
the end of Section 2, since the final, correlated state of the system and the apparatus will
be faithfully described by Eqs. (2.7) and (2.9). No additional reduction of the state vector
will be needed, as the projection operators Pi defining the eigenspaces of the measured
observable commute with the states which invariably (that is, regardless of the initial form
of the state of the system) appear on the diagonal of the density matrix describing the
system.
This feat is accomplished by the coupling to the environment – which, as is well
known, results in noise, and, therefore, in a degraded predictability. However, it also leads
to a specification of what are the preferred observables – what set of states constitutes the
preferred classical “pointer basis” which can be measured relatively safely, with a minimal
loss of previously acquired information. This is because the rate at which the predictability
is degraded is crucially dependent on the state of the system. The initial state is in turn
determined by what was measured. We shall show that the differences in the rates at which
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predictability is lost are sufficiently dramatic that only for certain selections of the sets of
states – and of the corresponding observables – can one expect to develop the idealized
but very useful approximation of classical reality.
Another, complementary way of viewing the process of decoherence is to recognize that
the environment acts, in effect, as an observer continuously monitoring certain preferred
observables which are selected mainly by the system - environment interaction hamilto-
nians. Other physical systems which perform observations (such as the “real” observers)
will gain little predictive power from a measurement which prepares the system in a state
which does not nearly coincide with the states already monitored by the environment.
Thus, the demand for predictability forces observers to conform and measure what is al-
ready being monitored by the environment. Indeed, in nearly all familiar circumstances,
observers gain information by “bleeding off” small amounts of the information which has
been already disseminated into the environment (for example by intercepting a fraction of
photons which have scattered off the object one is looking at while the rest of the photons
act effectively as an environment). In such a case, the observer must be prepared to work
with the observables premeasured by the environment. Moreover, even if it was some-
how possible to make a measurement of some other very different set of observables with
the eigenstates which are given by exotic superpositions of the states monitored by the
environment, records of such observables would become useless on a timescale on which
the environment is monitoring the preferred states. For, the “measurements” carried out
by the environment would invalidate such data on a decoherence timescale – that is, well
before the predictions about the future measurements made on its basis could be verified.
In what follows we shall therefore search for the sets of observables as well as the
corresponding sets of states of open quantum systems which offer optimal predictability
of their own future values. This requirement embodies a recognition of the fact that our
measuring equipment (including our senses) used in keeping track of the familiar reality
is relatively time-independent, and that the only measurements we are capable of refer to
small fragments of the Universe – individual systems. We shall be considering sequences
of measurements carried out on ensembles of identical open quantum systems. We shall
return to the discussion of the practical implementation of this programme in Sections 6
and 7, having introduced – in the next section – a simple and tractable model in which
decoherence can be conveniently studied.
5. Environment-Induced Decoherence in Quantum Brownian Motion.
The separation of the Universe into subsystems, indispensable in stating the problem,
is also instrumental in pointing out a way to its resolution. Our experience proves that
classical systems – such as an apparatus – have a right to individual states. Moreover,
these states are not some arbitrary states admissible in HA which can be selected on a
whim by an external observer (as would be the case for an ordinary quantum system)
but, rather, appear to be “stable” in that the state in which A is eventually found is
always one of the “eigenstates” of the same “menu” of options – i.e. the apparatus has a
preferred “pointer observable.” Thus, even though the correlated system - apparatus state
vector |ΦAS(t) >, Eq. (2.3), can be in principle rewritten using any (complete) basis in HA
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(Zurek, 1981; 1991), this formal application of the superposition principle and the resulting
analogy with nonseparable EPR correlations is not reflected in “the familiar reality”. The
familiar macroscopic systems tend to be well localized with respect to the usual classical
observables – such as position, energy, etc.
Here we shall see how this tendency towards localization, as well as the choice of
the preferred observables can be accounted for by the process of decoherence: A classical
system (such as an apparatus) will be continuously interacting with its environment. Con-
sequently, its density matrix will obey an irreversible master equation, valid whenever the
environment is sufficiently large to have a Poincare´ recurrence time much longer than any
other relevant timescale in the problem – in particular, much longer than the timescale
over which one may attempt to predict its behavior or to verify its classicality.
A useful example of such a master equation can be derived – under certain reason-
able, although not quite realistic circumstances – for a particle of mass m moving in a
potential V (x), and interacting with the external scalar field (the environment) through
the hamiltonian
Hint = ǫxϕ˙(0). (5.1)
In the high-temperature limit the reduced density matrix of the particle will obey the
equation (written below in the position representation):
d
dt
ρ(x, x′) = −
i
h¯
[HR, ρ]− γ(x− x
′)(
∂
∂x
−
∂
∂x′
)ρ−
ηkBT
h¯2
(x− x′)2ρ. (5.2)
Above HR is the hamiltonian of the particle with VR(x) renormalized by the interaction
with the field, η is the viscosity coefficient (η = ǫ
2
2
, γ = η
2m
), and T is the temperature
of the field. Similar equations have been derived under a variety of assumptions by, for
example, Caldeira and Leggett (1983; 1985), Joos and Zeh (1985), Unruh and Zurek (1989),
and Hu, Paz and Zhang (1992).
The preferred basis emerges through the process of “negative selection”: In the “clas-
sical” regime associated with h¯ small relative to the effective action the last term of Eq.
(5.2) dominates and induces the following evolution of the density matrix:
ρ(x, x′; t) = ρ(x, x′; 0) exp(−
ηkBT
h¯2
(x− x′)2t). (5.3)
Thus, superpositions in position will disappear on the decoherence timescale of order:
τD = γ
−1(λT /∆x)
2 (5.4)
where γ−1 is the relaxation rate
< v˙ >= −γ < v > (5.5)
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This observation* marked an important shift from the idealized models of decoherence in
the context of quantum measurements to the study of more relistic models better suited
to the discussion of classicality in the “everyday” context. The conclusion is simple: Only
relatively localized states will survive interaction with the environment. Spread-out su-
perpositions of localized wavepackets will be rapidly destroyed as they will quickly evolve
into mixtures of localized states.
This special role of the position can be traced to the form of the hamiltonian of inter-
action between the system and the environment, Eq. (5.1): The dependence on x implies
a sensitivity to position, which is, in effect, continuously monitored by the environment.
In general, the observable Λ which will commute with Hint;
[Hint,Λ] = 0 , (5.6)
will play a key role in determining the preferred basis: Superpositions of its eigenspaces
will be unstable in the presence of the interaction with the environment. Thus, the special
role position plays in our description of the physical Universe can be traced (Zurek, 1986)
to the form of the interaction potentials between its subsystems (including the elemen-
tary particles and atoms) which is almost invariably position dependent (and, therefore,
commutes with the position observable).
The result of such processes is the “effective superselection rule,” which destroys su-
perpositions of the eigenspaces of Λ, so that the density matrix describing the open system
will very quickly become approximately co-diagonal with Λ. Thus, the classical system
can be thought of – on a timescale of several τD – as a mixture (and not a superposition)
of the approximate eigenstates of position defined with the accuracy of the corresponding
∆x. This approximation becomes better when the self hamiltonian of the system is less
important when compared to Hint. Thus, for example, overdamped systems have preferred
states which are squeezed in position, while weakly damped harmonic oscillator translates
position into momentum every quarter of its period and, consequently, favors still localized,
but much more symmetric coherent states. Moreover, for macroscopic masses and sepa-
rations the decoherence timescale is very small compared to the relaxation time (Zurek,
1984 and 1991).
The ability to describe the state of the system in terms of the probability distribution of
the same few variables is the essence of effective classicality: It corresponds to the assertion
that the system already has its own state (one of the states of the preferred basis) which
is not necessarily known to the observer prior to the measurement, but is, nevertheless,
already quite definite. It is important to emphasize that while this statement is, strictly
* See Zurek (1984) for the first discussion of this decoherence timescale; Zurek (1991)
from the Wigner distribution function perspective; Hartle (1991) for a nice perspective
based on effective action; Paz (1992) for a quick assessment of the role of the spectral
density in the environment on the effectiveness of decoherence and Paz, Habib and Zurek
(1992) for a more complete assessment of this important issue as well as for a discussion
of the accuracy of the high temperature approximation, Eq. (5.2).
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speaking, incorrect (there is actually a very messy entangled state vector including both the
system and the environment) it cannot be falsified by any feasible measurement. Thus,
the quantum Universe gives rise to an effectively classical domain defined through the
operational validity of the assertions concerning “reality” of the states of the observables
it contains.
6. Preferred States and the “Predictability Sieve”
In the preceding section we have confirmed that – at least for the model presented
above – states localized in the familiar classical observable, position, will be among these
selected by the decoherence process and, therefore, are effectively classical. Here I shall
reverse the procedure. That is, I shall first formulate a test which will act, in effect, as
a sieve, a filter accepting certain states in the Hilbert space of the system and rejecting
others. The aim of this procedure will be to arrive at an algorithm capable of singling
out preferred sets of states ab initio, rather than just confirming the suspicions about
classicality of certain observables. The guide in devising the appropriate procedure is a
decade - old observation (Zurek, 1981; 1982) that – under some special assumptions –
the absolutely preferred states remain completely unaffected by the environment. In the
absence of these special conditions it is therefore natural to search for the states which are
least affected by the interaction with the external degrees of freedom (Zurek, 1984; Unruh
and Zurek, 1989). And a convenient measure of the influence of the environment on the
state is – as was already mentioned – the ability to predict its future evolution, to use the
results of the past measurements as initial conditions.
Let us consider an infinite ensemble of identical systems immersed in identical en-
vironments. The aim of the test will be to find which initial states allow for optimal
predictability. In order to settle this question, we shall imagine testing all the states in
the Hilbert space of the system HS . To this end, we shall prepare the system in every
conceivable pure initial state, let it evolve for a fixed amount of time, and then determine
the resulting final state – which, because of the interaction with the environment, will be
nearly always given by a mixture.
Entropy of the final density matrix ρk which has evolved from the initial state |k >;
hk = −Trρk log ρk (6.1)
is a convenient measure of the loss of predictability. It will be different for different initial
states. One can now sort the list of all possible pure states in order of the decreasing
entropy hk of the final mixed state: At the head will be the states for which the increase
of entropy is the least, followed by the states which are slightly less predictable, and so on,
until all of the pure states are assigned a place on the list.
The best candidates for the classical “preferred states” are, clearly, near the top of
the list. One may, nevertheless, ask where should one put a cut in the above list to define
a border between the preferred classical set of states and the non-classical remainder. The
answer to this question is somewhat arbitrary: Where exactly the quantum-classical border
is erected is a subjective matter, to be decided by circumstances. What is, perhaps, more
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important is the nature of the answer which emerges from this procedure aimed at selecting
the preferred set of states.
A somewhat different in detail, but similar in the spirit procedure for sorting the
Hilbert space would start with the same initial list of the states and evolve them until the
same loss of predictability – quantified by the entropy of the final mixture – has occurred.
The list of states would be then sorted according to the length of time involved in the
predictability loss, with the states which are predictable to the same degree for the longest
time appearing on the top of the list.
It should be pointed out that the qualifying preferred states will generally form (i) an
overcomplete set, and (ii) they may be confined to a subspace of HS . These likely results
of the application of the “predictability sieve” outlined above will have to be treated as a
“fact of life”. In particular, overcompleteness seems to be a feature of many a “nice” basis
– for example, coherent states are overcomplete. Moreover, it is entirely conceivable that
classical states may not exist for a given system in all of its Hilbert space.
It is reassuring to note that, in the situations in which an exact pointer observable
exists (that is, there is a nontrivial observable which commutes with the complete hamil-
tonian, H +Hint, of the system of interest; see Zurek, 1981-1983) its eigenstates can be
immediately placed on top of either of the predictability lists described above. The pre-
dictability sieve selects them because they are completely predictable; they do not evolve
at all. Hence, there is no corresponding increase of entropy.
One key ingredient of the first of the predictability sieves outlined above remains
arbitrary: We have not specified the interval of time over which the evolution is supposed to
take place. This aspect of the selection process will clearly influence the entropy generated
in the system. We shall insist that this time interval should remain somewhat arbitrary.
That is, the set of the selected preferred states for any time t much longer than the typical
decoherence timescale τD, but much shorter than the timescale τEQ over which the system
reaches thermodynamic equilibrium with its environment should be substantially similar.
Similarly, for the second proposed sieve we have not specified the loss of predictability
(increase of entropy) which must be used to define the timescale characterizing the location
of the state on the list. Again, we expect that the list should not be too sensitive to this
parameter: Indeed, the two versions of the sieve should yield similar sets of preferred
states.
The distinction between the preferred set of states and the rest of the Hilbert space
– the contrast indicated by the predictability sieve outlined above – should depend on the
mass of the system or on the value of the Planck constant. Thus, it should be possible
to increase the contrast between the preferred set of states and the other states which
decohere much more rapidly by investigating the behavior of the entropy with varying m
and h¯ in mathematical models of these systems. It is easy to see how such a procedure
will work in the case of quantum Brownian motion described in the preceding section. In
particular, reversible Newtonian dynamics can coexist with a very efficient environment-
induced superselection process in the appropriate limit (Zurek, 1984; 1991): It is possible to
increase mass, decrease the Planck constant, and, at the same time, decrease the relaxation
14
rate to zero, so that the master equation Eq. (5.2) yields reversible Liouville dynamics for
the phase space probability distributions constructed from the sets of localized states (such
as the coherent states), but eliminates (by degrading them into mixtures of the localized
states) all other initial conditions.
A natural generalization of the predictability sieve can be applied to mixtures. Let
us construct a list of all the mixtures which have the same initial entropy hm(0) using
either of the two prescriptions outlined above. We can now consider their evolution and
enquire about the entropy of the mixed state after some time t. An ordered list of the
initial mixtures can be again constructed and the top of the list can be identified. An
interesting question can be now posed: Are the mixtures on top of the initial mixture
list diagonal in the pure states which are on top of the list of preferred states? When the
exact pointer pointer basis in the sense of the early references on this subject (Zurek, 1981;
1982; 1983) exists, the conjecture expressed above can be readily demonstrated: Mixtures
of the pointer basis eigenstates do not evolve at all. Therefore, their entropy remains the
same. Any other kind of mixture will become even more mixed because superpositions of
the pointer basis states decohere. Consequently, at least in this case the most predictable
mixtures are diagonal in the basis of the most predictable states.
In this preliminary discussion we have neglected several issues which are likely to play
a role in the future developments of the predictability sieve concept. In particular, we have
ignored to enforce explicitly the requirement (stated in Section 4) that the measurements
which have prepared the set of the candidate states should be suitable for the predictions of
their own future outcomes. (For the closed systems this criterion naturally picks out com-
plete sets of commuting observables corresponding to the conserved quantities.) Moreover,
we have used only the statistical entropy to assess the cost of the predictability loss.
An addition of an algorithmic component might make for an even more interesting
criterion. That is, the place of the pure state |ℓ > on the list would be based on the value
of the physical entropy (Zurek, 1989), given by the sum of the physical entropy with the
algorithmic information content K(|ℓ >):
s(|ℓ >) = hℓ +K(|ℓ >) . (6.2)
Algorithmic contribution would discourage overly complicated states.
It is interesting to consider a possibility of using a similar predictability criterion to
justify the division of the Universe into separate systems. The argument (which will be
made more precise elsewhere) would start with the list of all of the possible states in some
composite Hilbert space, perhaps even the Hilbert space associated with the Universe as
a whole. The procedure would then be largely similar to the simpler version of the sieve
outlined above, but with one important change: One will be allowed to vary the defini-
tion of the systems – that is, to test various projection operators, such as the projections
corresponding to averaging process – to establish the most predictable collective coordi-
nates, and, simultaneously, to obtain the preferred sets of states corresponding to such
observables.
7. Predictability Sieve: An Example
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A simple example of the dependence of the entropy production rate on the set of
preferred states is afforded by a model of a single harmonic oscillator interacting with a
heat bath we have analysed in Section 5. In this section we shall carry out a restricted
version of the more ambitious and general “predictability sieve” programme for this case.
In its complete version one would search for the set of states which minimize the entropy
over a finite time duration of the order of the dynamical timescale of the system. Below
we shall work with an instantaneous rate of change of linear entropy. A more detailed
analysis can be found elsewhere (Zurek, Habib and Paz, 1992).
Linear entropy
ς(ρ) = Tr(ρ− ρ2) (7.1)
is losely related to the “real thing” through the expansion:
h(ρ) = −Trρ ln ρ ≈ Trρ{(1− ρ) + (1− ρ)2 + · · · = ς(ρ) + · · · (7.2)
Moreover, it is in its own right a recognized measure of the purity of a state. Consequently,
in what follows I shall “cut corners” and consider the quantity:
ς˙ =
d Trρ2
dt
= Tr(ρ˙ρ+ ρρ˙) (7.3)
for the initial pure states (that is, for all the density operators for which ρ2 = ρ). By
contrast, the more ambitious programme would deal with entropy increase over finite time
of the order of the dynamical timescale of the system.
In the high temperature limit the equation which governs the evolution of the reduced
density operator can be written in the operator form as (Caldeira and Leggett, 1983):
ρ˙ =
1
ih¯
[HR, ρ] +
γ
2ih¯
[{p, x}, ρ] −
ηkBT
h¯2
[x, [x, ρ]] −
iγ
h¯
([x, ρp] − [p, ρx]) . (7.4)
Above, square brackets and curly brackets indicate commutators and anticommutators,
respectively, while HR is the renormalized hamiltonian.
Only the last two terms can be directly responsible for generation of linear entropy;
For, when the evolution of the density matrix is generated by the term of the form ρ˙ =
[A, ρ], then the linear entropy is unaffected. The proof of the above assertion is simple: It
suffices to substitute in the expression for ς˙, Eq. (7.3), the above commutator form for the
evolution generator of ρ. Then it is easy to compute:
ς˙ = Tr(Aρ2 − ρ2A)
which is obviously zero by the cyclic property of trace.
Consequently, after some algebra one obtains:
ς˙ =
4ηkBT
h¯2
Tr(ρ2x2 − ρxρx) − 2γTrρ2 (7.5)
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When the system is nearly reversible (γ ≈ 0) the second term in the above equation is
negligible. This is especially true in the high temperature “macroscopic” limit (large mass,
small Planck constant). It should be pointed out that the initial “decrease of entropy”
predicted by this last term for sufficiently localized wavepackets is unphysical and an
artifact of the high temperature approximation (Ambegaokar, private communication; Hu,
Paz, and Zhang, 1992). Nevertheless, at late times the existence of that term allows for
the eventual equilibrium with ς˙ = 0.
For the pure states the first term can be easily evaluated:
ς˙ =
4ηkBT
h¯2
· (< x2 > − < x >2) , (7.6)
where < x >2= | < ϕ|x|ϕ > |2 and < x2 >=< ϕ|x2|ϕ >. This is an interesting result.
We have just demonstrated that for pure states the rate of increase of linear entropy in
quantum Brownian motion is given by their dispersion in position, which is the preferred
observable singled out by the interaction hamiltonian. More generally, when the system is
described by a density matrix so that Eq. (7.5) must be used, it is easy to see that the
density matrix which has fewer superpositions of distinct values of x will result in a smaller
entropy production. Thus, the special role of the observable responsible for the coupling
with the environment is rather transparent in both of the above equations.
In view of the preceding considerations on the role of predictability it is now easy to
understand why localized states are indeed favored and form the classical preferred basis.
It should be emphasized that this simple result cannot be used to infer that the preferred
states are simply eigestates of position. This is because the self-hamiltonian – while it
does not contribute directly to the entropy production – has an important indirect effect.
For a harmonic oscillator it rotates the state in the phase space, so that the spread in
momentum becomes “translated” into the spread in position and vice versa. As a result,
linear entropy produced over one oscillator period τ is given by:
ςτ =
4ηkBT
h¯2
∫ τ
0
dt < ψ|((x− < x >) cosωt+ (mω)−1(p− < p >) sinωt)2|ψ >
=
2ηkBT
h¯2
(∆x20 +
∆p20
m2ω2
) . (7.7)
Above, the dispersions are computed for the pure initial state |ψ > and ω is the frequency
of the oscillator.
It is now not difficult to argue that the initial which minimizes linear entropy pro-
duction for a harmonic oscillator must be (i) a minimum uncertainty wavepacket, and
(ii) its “squeeze parameter” s – equal to the initial ratio between its spread in position
and the spread of the ground state – must be equal to unity. This can be confirmed by
more detailed calculations, which yield the value of Trρ2 for the reduced density matrices
which have evolved from various initial states with different s as a function of time. Co-
herent states (minimum uncertainty wavepackets with s = 1) are clearly selected by the
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predictability sieve acting on a dynamical timescale of the oscillator (see Fig. 1). This
supplies a physical reason for the role they play in harmonic motion, including its examples
encountered in quantum optics.
8. Insensitivity to Measurements and Consistent Histories
In 1984 Griffiths introduced a notion of history into the vocabulary used in the discus-
sion of quantum systems. A history is a time-ordered sequence of properties represented
by means of projection operators:
χi,j,...,l = Pi(ti)E(ti, tj)Pj(tj) . . . Pl(tl)E(tl, t0) (8.1)
where ti > tj > . . . > tl, P ’s stand for the projection operators (assumed to be mutu-
ally orthogonal at each of the discrete instants at which the corresponding properties are
defined) and E(t, t′) evolve the system in the time interval (t, t′). The set of histories is
called consistent when they do not interfere, that is, when the probabilities corresponding
to different histories can be added. Griffiths (1984) and Omne`s (1990,1992) (who empha-
sized the potential importance of the consistent histories approach to the interpretation of
quantum theory) have demonstrated that a necessary and sufficient condition for the set of
histories composed of the initial condition and just two additional events to be consistent
is that the projection operators defining the properties at the instants 0, 1, and 2, when
expressed in the Heisenberg picture, satisfy the algebraic relation;
Re TrP1P0P¯1P2 = 0 , (8.2)
or, equivalently;
Tr[P1, [P0, P¯1]]P2 = 0 . (8.3)
These equivalent consistency conditions must hold for every of the projection operators
in the sets defined at the initial, intermediate, and final instants. Above, P¯i = 1 − Pi
projects on the complement of the Hilbert space. Above, the explicit reference to the
time instants at which different projection operators act has been abbreviated to a single
index to emphasize that the time ordering is assumed to hold. There is also a stronger
consistency condition (Gell-Mann and Hartle, 1990) with a physical motivation which
draws on the decoherence process we have discussed above: It is possible to show that
a sufficient condition for a family of histories to be consistent is the vanishing of the
off-diagonal elements of the decoherence functional:
D(χ, χ′) = Tr(P2P1P0P
′
1) (8.4)
Generalization to histories with more intermediate properties or with the initial condi-
tion given by a density matrix is straightforward. One of the appealing features of the
Gell-Mann - Hartle approach is that it supplies a convenient measure of the degree of
inconsistency for the proposed sets of histories.
In all of the above consistency requirements above P0 acts as an initial condition and
P2 (or, more generally, the set of projection operators corresponding to the “last” instant)
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acts as a final condition. The two sets of projection operators determine the initial and
final sets of alternatives for the system. (It is of course possible to start the system in
a mixture of different P0’s.) This special role of the initial and final sets of projection
operators was emphasized already by Griffiths (1984). It is particularly easy to appreciate
in the version of the consistent histories approach due to Gell-Mann and Hartle (1990;
1991; see also their contribution in this volume).
Mathematically, the similarity between the role of the initial and final projections in
the formula for D(χ, χ′) follows from the cyclic property of the trace. It is reflected in the
special physical function of these two instants, which is usually defined by appealing to
the physical content of the situation to which the consistent histories approach is applied.
For example, in the context originally considered by Griffiths the initial condition and
the set of final alternative properties were suggested by the detectors contained inside the
closed system under investigation (see especially section 3 of Griffiths, 1984). That is,
the consistent histories approach is capable of disposing of the outside intervention at the
intermediate instants, but not at the initial or final moments. Of course, in search for
consistency one can explore a variety of selections for the final set of projectors. Thus, if
there was just a single, unique set of consistent histories, one would be still guaranteed to
find it by employing the search procedure involving first a selection of the preferred sets of
initial and final projectors, and then enquiring whether intermediate projectors consistent
with these initial and final conditions can be found. Unfortunately, consistent histories can
be found rather easily simply by evolving initial (or final) sets of projectors. Moreover,
these histories, while they are perfectly consistent, seem to have little in common with the
classical “familiar reality”. Indeed, the demand for strict consistency will most likely have
to be relaxed if the quantummechanical histories are to be consistent with the reality we
perceive. In this context, where the demand for consistency is easily satisfied, and where
the consistent histories are crucially influenced by the initial and final selections, there is
reason for concern with the ability of such “outside” selections to unduly influence the
results.
In the cosmological context the initial density matrix could be perhaps supplied by
quantum cosmological considerations but the final set of alternatives is more difficult to
justify. This distinction between the role of the intermediate and final projections is worth
emphasizing especially because it is somewhat obscured by the notation which does not
distinguish between the special nature of the “last” property and the associated set of the
projection operators and the intermediate properties. (The initial time instant is usually
explicitly recognized as different by notation, since density matrices are typically considered
for the initial condition in the majority of the papers on the subject (Omne`s, 1992; Gell-
Mann and Hartle, 1990).) Yet, the final set of options should not be – especially in the
cosmological context, where one is indeed dealing with the closed system – determined
“from the outside”. The question therefore arises: How can one discuss consistency of
histories without appealing to this final set of “special” events?
Evolving density matrix can be, at any instant t, always written as:
ρ(t) =
∑
K
∑
K′
χ(K)ρ(0)χ(K′). (8.5)
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Above χ(K) is a collection of the projection operators with the appropriate evolution
operators sandwiched inbetween, and can be thought of as a hypothetical history of the
system. A composite index K designates a specific time - ordered sequence. Projectors
corresponding to K and K′ differ, but the time instants or evolutions do not.
Equation (8.5) is simply an identity, valid for arbitrary sets of orthocomplete projec-
tion operators defined at arbitrary intermediate instants ti, 0 < ti ≤ t. There is an obvious
formal similarity between the expression for the decoherence functional, Eq. (8.4), and the
identity, Eq. (8.5). If one were to perform a trace on the elements of ρ(t) corresponding to
pairs of different histories written in the above manner, one would immediately recover the
expression for the elements of the decoherence functional. The questions of consistency
of the sequences of events should be therefore at least partially testable at the level of
description afforded by the density matrix written in this “historical” notation. In partic-
ular, additivity of probabilities of the distinct sequences of events corresponds simply to
the diagonality of the above expression for ρ(t) in the set of considered histories. That is,
the set of histories {χ} will be called intrinsically consistent when they satisfy the equality:
ρ(t) = ρ¯(t) , (8.6)
where:
ρ¯(t) =
∑
K
χ(K)ρ(0)χ(K). (8.7)
The physical sense of the equality between the double sum of Eq. (8.5) (which is satis-
fied for every complete set of choices of the intermediate properties) and the single sum
immediately above (which can be satisfied for only very special choices of χ’s) is that
the interference terms between the properties defining the intrinsically consistent sets of
histories do not contribute to the final result;
∑
K6=K′
χ(K)ρ(0)χ(K′) = 0. (8.8)
An equivalent way of expressing the physical content of this equivalence condition, Eqs.
(8.6) or (8.8), is to use the terminology of Section 4 and note that the system is insensitive
to the measurement of the properties defined by such intrinsically consistent histories. An
obvious way in which the above equation can be satisfied, and the only way in which it can
be satisfied exactly without demanding cancellations between the the off-diagonal terms,
is to require that histories should be expressed in terms of the properties which correspond
to the operators which commute with the density matrix. This simple remark (which,
on a formal level, implies the consistency condition, Eq. (8.4)) is, I believe, essential in
understanding the connection between the consistent histories approach and the discussions
based on the process of decoherence.
An obvious exact solution suggested by the above considerations – a set of histories
based on the evolved states which diagonalize the initial density matrix – does supply a
formally acceptable set of consistent histories for a closed system, but it is very unattractive
in the cosmological, or indeed, any practical context. The resulting histories do not seem
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to have much in common with the familiar classical evolutions we have grown accustomed
to. It is clear that additional constraints will need to be imposed, and the search for such
constraints is under way (Gell-Mann and Hartle, 1990; 1991; Omne`s, 1992).
In the decoherence approach presented in this paper the additional constraints on the
acceptable sets of consistent histories are supplied through insistence on the observables
which correspond to separate systems. This assumption significantly constrains sets of the
“properties of interest” (see the contribution of Albrecht to these proceedings as well as
Albrecht (1992) for a discussion of this point). Indeed, the restriction is so severe that
one can no longer hope for the exact probability sum rules to be satisfied at all times.
Thus, instead of the ideal additivity of the probabilities (or ideal diagonality of the density
matrix in the set of preferred pointer states) one must settle for approximations to the
ideal which violate it at a negligible level almost all the time, and which may violate it at
a significant level for a negligible fraction of time.
Insensitivity of the system to measurements proposed in Section 4 as a criterion for
classicality emerges as a useful concept unifying these two approaches – the environment-
induced decoherence and the consistent histories interpretations. The condition of equality
between the evolved density matrix, with its double summation over the pairs of histories,
and the restricted sum over the diagonal elements only, Eq. (8.7), can be expressed by
noting that the measurements of the properties in terms of which the consistent histories
are written does not perturb the evolution of the system. This suggests a physically
appealing view of the consistent histories approach in the context of the environment-
induced decoherence: Measurements of the preferred observable do not alter the evolution
of the system which is already monitored by the environment!
9. Preferred Basis, Pointer Observables, and the Sum Rules
In the last section we have discussed a connection between the consistency of histories
and the notion of insensitivity of a quantum system to measurements. Such insensitivity
underlies much of our classical intuition. It has served as an important conceptual input in
the discussion of the environment - induced superselection, decoherence, and the preferred
pointer basis. If the conceptual link between the foundations of the “many histories inter-
pretation” and the preferred basis of an open system does indeed exist, one should be able
to exhibit a still more direct relationship between the formalisms of these two approaches.
Let us consider a system interacting with a large environment. In accord with the
preceding discussion, I shall focus on its reduced density matrix ρ(t) ≡ ρS(t) which can
be always computed by evolving the whole, combined system unitarily from the initial
condition, and then tracing out the environment. Throughout much of this section we
shall also work under a more restrictive assumption: We shall consider only situations
in which the reduced density matrix of the system suffices to compute the decoherence
functional. It should be emphasized that this is not a trivial assumption, as the consistent
histories formalism was introduced for closed quantum systems and its extension to the
open quantum systems (required in essentially all practical applications, since macroscopic
systems are nearly impossible to isolate from their environments) leads to difficulties some
of which have not yet been even pointed out in the literature until now, let alone addressed.
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The nature of this demand is best appreciated by noting that (given a split between
the system and the environment and the usual tracing over the environment degrees of
freedom) we are demanding that the consistency of the histories for the whole Universe
with the events defined through Pk ⊗ 1E must be closely related to the consistency of the
histories with the events Pk in the history of the open system. Using the decoherence
functional, the strongest form of such equivalence could be expressed by the equality:
DSE ≡ TrSE{1E⊗Pl . . .1E⊗Pi . . .ρSE . . .P
′
i⊗1E ...} = TrS{Pl . . .Pi . . .ρ . . .P
′
i . . .} ≡ DS
(9.1)
Above, “. . .” stand for the appropriate evolutions inbetween events (which is unitary
for SE considered jointly and non-unitary for S alone). While the above equation has the
advantage of stating a requirement with brevity, one should keep in mind not only that
the diagonality of the decoherence functional is a more restrictive condition than the one
necessary to satisfy the sum rules, but also that exact diagonality is not to be expected
in the physically interesting situations. Moreover, when the approximate consistency is
enough (as would have to be almost always the case) the equality above could be replaced
by an approximate equality, or could hold with a very good accuracy almost always, but
be violated for a fraction of time which is sufficiently small not to be worrisome. Finally, it
is conceivable that the approximate equality could hold only for a certain sets of projection
operators, and not for others. We shall not attempt to analyse these possibilities here. For
the time being, we only note that whenever the density matrix of the open system obeys a
master equation which is local in time (such as Eq. (5.2)) the reduced density matrix will
suffice to express the decoherence functional. These issues will be discussed in a separate
paper (Paz and Zurek, 1992).
To begin the discussion of the connection between the pointer basis and the consistent
histories approach I shall assume – guided by the experience with the environment - induced
superselection – that after a decoherence time the density matrix of the system settles into
a state which, irregardless of the initial form of the state of the system ends up being nearly
diagonal in the preferred basis Pi. I shall, for the moment, demand exact diagonality and
show that it implies exact consistency.
Let us first consider an initial state which is a projection operator Qo, and a historical
property which corresponds to a pointer observable:
Λi =
∑
i
λiPi , (9.2)
which commutes with the reduced density matrix:
ρQo(t
i) = TrEρSE(t
i) , (9.3)
at the first historical instant;
[Λi, ρQo(ti)] = 0 . (9.4)
Above, the lower case “i” plays a double role: When in subscript, it is a running index
which can be summed over (as in Eq. (9.2)). When in the superscript it is used to label
the instant of time (i. e. ti, tj , etc.) or a pointer observable (Λi) at that instant.
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Given Eq. (9.2), the density matrix can be written as:
ρQo(t
i) =
∑
i
p(i|o)ρii|o =
∑
i
PiρQo(t
i)Pi . (9.5)
In other words, the system is insensitive to the measurement of the pointer observable at
that instant. Above, p(i|o) = TrSPiρQo(t
i)Pi is the conditional probability that a pointer
projector Pi would have been measured at a time t
i given that the system started its
evolution in the state Qo at the initial instant. The conditional density matrix;
ρii|o = PiρQo(t
i)Pi/p(i|o) (9.6)
which appears in Eq. (9.5) will, in general, contain additional information about the
measurements of higher resolution which could have been carried out. It would reduce to
unity when TrPi = 1.
Given this form of the reduced density matrix at ti it is not difficult to evaluate the
contribution of that instant to the decoherence functional for histories including other
properties {Pk} at the corresponding instants t
k:
DQo(χi,j,...l, χi′,j′,...l) = Tr{...(PiρQo(ti)P
′
i )...} = p(i|o)Dρii|o(χj,...l, χj′,...l)δii′ (9.7)
Above, the projection is followed by the (nonunitary) evolution which continues until the
next projection, and so on, until the final instant tl. The off-diagonal elements of the
decoherence functional are always zero because of our simplifying assumption of existence
of a perfect pointer basis at each “historical” instant.
Such computation can be carried out step by step until finally one can write;
DQo(χ, χ) = p(l|k...j|i|o)...p(j|i|o)p(i|o) , (9.8)
and;
DQo(χ 6= χ
′) = 0 (9.9)
for the case when pointer observables existed and were used to define properties at each
historical time instant.
When the initial state was mixed and of the form;
ρ(to) =
∑
o
p(Qo)Qo , (9.10)
the elements of the above formula for the decoherence functional would have to be weighted
by the probabilities of the initial states, so that;
Dρ =
∑
o
p(Qo)DQo . (9.11)
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Conditional probabilities in Eq. (9.8) can be simplified when the “historical process” is
Markovian, so that the probability of the “next” event depends only on the preceding
historical event. Delineating the exact set of conditions which must be satisfied for this
Markovian property to hold is of interest, but, again, beyond the scope of this paper:
Markovian property of the underlying dissipative dynamics is not enough. One can, how-
ever, see that the process will be Markovian when the projections are onto rays in the
Hilbert space. By contrast, conditional probabilities will be determined to a large extent
by the properties in the more distant past when such events have had a better resolution –
that is, if they projected onto smaller subspaces of the Hilbert space of the system – than
the more recent ones.
We have thus seen than when (i) the density matrix of the system alone is enough to
study consistency of histories and (ii) when the system evolves into density matrix which
is exactly diagonal in the same set of pointer states each time historical properties are
established, then the histories expressed in terms of the pointer projectors are exactly con-
sistent. In the more realistic cases the reduced density matrix will be only approximately
diagonal in the set of preferred states. It is therefore of obvious interest to enquire how
the deviations from diagonality translate into a partial loss of consistency.
To study this case we suppose now that the reduced density matrix of the system at
a time ti does not satisfy Eq. (9.4), but, rather, is given by;
ρQo(t
i) =
∑
i
p(i|o)ρii|o +
∑
i6=i′
PiρQo(t
i)P ′i . (9.12)
Below, we shall set ̺ii′|o = PiρQo(t
i)P ′i . Following the similar procedure as before one
obtains (for the diagonal contribution at the instant ti) the same formula as before. By
contrast, an off-diagonal term also contributes;
DQo(χi,j,...l, χi′,j′,...l) = D̺ii′|o(χj,...l, χj′,...l) . (9.13)
The new “initial density matrices” for such off-diagonal terms are non-hermitean. Never-
theless, they can be evolved using – for example – the appropriate master equation and
will contribute to the off-diagonal terms of the decoherence functional. Moreover, the size
of their contribution to the decoherence functional can be computed by writing them as a
product of a hermitean density matrix and an annihilation operator;
̺ii′ = qii′|o ρii′|o Πii′ , (9.14)
where;
Pi = Πii′ P
′
i Π
†
ii′ , (9.15)
and q(ii′|o) is the trace of this component of ̺ii′ which remains after separating out Πii′ .
The simplest example of this procedure obtains in the case when the projectors are one-
dimensional. Then Eq. (9.14) simplifies and the off-diagonal element of the decoherence
functional can be evaluated by a formula similar to the one for diagonal elements:
DQo(χi,j,...l, χi′,j′,...l) = q(ii
′|o)DΠ
ii′
(χj,...l, χj′,...l) . (9.16)
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Expressing the decoherence functional in this form allows one to estimate the decrease
of the potential for interference – for the violations of the sum rules – from the relative
sizes of the numerical coefficients such as p(i|o) and q(ii′|o), products of which establish
the “relative weight” of the various on-diagonal and off-diagonal terms. Similar procedure
applies also more generally and leads to a formula:
DQo(χi,j,...l, χi′,j′,...l) = q(ii
′|o)Dρ
ii′|oΠii′
(χj,...l, χj′,...l) . (9.17)
Equations (9.7), (9.8) and (9.17) – representing individual steps in evaluation of the de-
coherence functional – can be repeated to obtain “chain formulas” of the kind exhibited
before in this section. We shall not go into such details which are relatively straightforward
conceptually but rather cumbersome notationally.
These considerations establish a direct link between the process of decoherence with
its preferred observables, corresponding sets of states, etc., and the requirement of con-
sistency as it is implemented by the decoherence functional. It is now clear that – given
the assumptions stated early on in this section – the environment induced superselection
implies consistency of the histories expressed in terms of the pointer basis states. It should
be nevertheless emphasized that the issue of the applicability of the sum rules and the
consistency criteria address – in spite of that link – questions which differ, in their phys-
ical content, from these which are usually posed and considered as a motivation for the
environment - induced decoherence and the resulting effective superselection.
The key distinction arises simply from the rather limited goal of the consistent histories
programme – the desire to ascribe probabilities to quantum histories – which can be very
simply satisfied by letting the histories follow the unitary evolution of the states which
were on the diagonal of the density matrix of the Universe at the initial instant. This
obvious answer has to be dismissed as irrelevant (Gell-Mann and Hartle, 1990) since it has
nothing to do with the “familiar reality”. The obvious question to ask is then whether the
approximate compliance with the sum rules (which have to be relaxed anyway to relate
the histories to the “familiar reality”) would not arise as a byproduct of a different set of
more restrictive requirements, such as these considered in the discussions of environment-
induced decoherence. In the opinion of this author, the division of the Universe into parts
– subsystems – some of which are “of interest” while other act as “the environment”
is essential. It is required in stating the problem of interpretation of quantum theory.
Moreover, it automatically rules out trivial solutions of the kind discussed above, while, at
the same time, allowing for the consistency of histories expressed in terms of the preferred
basis. In this context the approximate validity of the sum rules which is of course an
important prerequisite for classicality, arises naturally as a consequence of the opennes of
the systems through the dynamics of the process of decoherence.
10. Preferred Sets of States and Diagonality
Diagonality of the density matrix in some basis alone is not enough to satisfy the
physical criteria of classicality. Pointer states should not be defined as the states which
just happen to diagonalize the reduced density matrix at a certain instant. What is
25
crucial (and sometimes forgotten in the discussions of these issues) is the requirement of
stability of the members of the preferred basis (expressed earlier in this paper in terms
of predictability). This was the reason why the preferred observable was defined in the
early papers on this subject through its ability to retain correlations with other systems
in spite of the contact with the environment (Zurek, 1981). Hence, the early emphasis on
the relation of the pointer observable to the interaction hamiltonian and the analogy with
the monitoring of the “nondemolition observables” (Caves et al., 1980).
An additional somewhat more technical comment – especially relevant in the context
of the many-histories approach – might be in order. One might imagine that the exact
diagonality of the density matrix in some basis (rather than existence of the stable pointer
basis) might be employed to guarantee consistency. After all, the property of the density
matrix we have used earlier in this section to establish consistency of the histories expressed
in terms of the pointer basis at a single instant, Eqs. (9.7) - (9.9) – was based on diagonality
alone. This might be possible if one were dealing with a single instant of time, but would
come with a heavy price when the evolution of the system is considered: The projection
operators which diagonalize the reduced density matrices which have evolved from certain
“events” in the history of the system will typically depend on these past events! That is, the
set of projectors on the diagonal of ρQo(ti) will be different from the set of projectors on the
diagonal of ρQ′
o
(ti) even when the initial conditions – say, Qo and Q
′
o – initially commute,
or even when they are orthogonal. This is because the evolution of the open system does
not preserve the value of the scalar products. Thus, for instance, the implication;
[ρ(0), ρ′(0)] = 0⇔ [ρ(t), ρ′(t)] = 0 , (10.1)
which is valid for unitary evolutions, does not hold for the evolution of open systems. This
can be established, for example, for the dissipative term of the master equation (5.2).
The implications of this phenomenon for both of the approaches considered here re-
mains to be explored. It seems, however, that consequences of such environment-induced
noncommutativity for the consistent histories approach could be quite important: The
standard formalism underlying the many - histories interpretation of quantum mechanics
requires an exhaustive set of exclusive properties which can be defined for the system under
study as a whole (see papers by Griffiths, Omne`s, Gell-Mann, and Hartle cited earlier).
This requirement is perfectly reasonable when the system in question is isolated and does
not include observers who decide what questions are being asked – what sets of projections
operators will be selected – as is surely the case for this Universe (see Wheelers “game
of twenty questions” in his 1979 paper). It could be perhaps satisfied for macroscopic
quantum systems of the sort considered in the context of quantum measurements for fi-
nite stretches of time. It is, however, difficult to imagine how it could be satisfied for
all the branches of the Universe and “for eternity”, especially since the effective hamil-
tonians which decide what are the sensible macroscopic observables are more often than
not themselves determined by the past events (including the dramatic symmetry breaking
transitions which are thought to have happened early on in the history of the Universe,
as well as much less dramatic, but also far less hypothetical transitions in macroscopic
systems). A similar comment can be made about the selection of the same “historical”
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instants of time in a multifarious Universe composed of branches which specifically differ
in the instant when a certain event has occurred.
The above remark leads one to suspect that such global (or, rather, universal) or-
thogonal sets of events at reasonably simultaneous instants of time cannot and satisfy the
demands of consistency “globally”. Only “local” properties defined in a way which ex-
plicitly recognizes the events which have occurred in the past history of the branch have
a chance of fulfilling this requirement. This suggests the interesting possibility that the
consistent history approach can be carried out with the same set of the event-defining
properties and for the same sequence of times only for a relatively local neighborhood of
some branch defined by the common set of essential ingredients (which can be in turn
traced to the events which contributed to their presence). Such branches would then also
share a common set of records – imprints of the past events reflected in the “present” states
of physical systems. It should be noted that while the standard formalism does not call for
the branch dependence, consistent histories framework can be generalized to acommodate
it. Indeed, both Omne`s (1990) as well as Gell-Mann and Hartle (1990) have mentioned
such branch-dependent histories in their papers. Environment-induced noncommutativity
may force one to consider this possibility even more seriously.
11. Records, Correlations and Interpretations
The discussion near the end of the last section forces us to shift the focus from the
histories defined in terms of “global” projection operators, abstract “events”, and equally
abstract “records” related to them and existing “outside” of the Universal state vector to
far more tangible “local” events which have shaped a specific evolution of “our” branch,
and which are imprinted as the real, accessible records in the states of physical systems. It
also emphasizes that even an exceedingly “nonperturbative” strategy of trying to identify
consistent causally connected sequences of events appears to have inevitable and identifi-
able physical consequences.
In a sense, we have come back full circle to the essence of the problem of measurement
understood here in a very non-anthropocentric manner, as a correlation between the states
of two systems, as an appearance of records within – rather than outside – of the state
vector of the Everett - like Universe. Moreover, if our conclusions about the need to
restrict the analysis of consistent histories to local bundles of branches derived from the
records which are in principle accessible from within these branches are correct, and the
emphasis on the coarse - grainings which acknowledge a division of the Universe into
systems (existence of which will undoubtedly be branch - dependent) is recognized, the
difference between the two ways of investigating classicality considered above begins to
fade away.
The central ingredient of the analysis is not just a state of the system, but, rather, a
correlation between states of two systems – one of which can be regarded as a record of
the other. The states of the systems we perceive as an essential part of classical reality are
nothing but a “shorthand” for the existence of a reliable correlation between these states
and the corresponding records – states of our memory (possibly extended by such external
devices as notebooks, RAM’s, or – on rare occasions – papers in conference proceedings).
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This “shorthand” is sufficient only because the states of physical system used as memories
are quite stable, so that their reliability (and effective classicality) can be taken for granted
at least in this context. Nevertheless, the only evidence for classicality comes not so much
from dealing with the bundles of histories which may or may not be consistent, but, rather,
from comparisons of these records, and from the remarkable ability to use the old records
as initial conditions which – together with the regularities known as “the laws of physics”
– allow one to predict the content of the records which will be made in the future.
If our discussion was really about the stability of correlations between the records
and the states (rather than just states) it seems appropriate to close this paper with a
brief restatement of the interpretation problem from such “correlation” point of view. The
entity we are concerned with is not just a to - be - classical system S interacting with the
environment, but, rather, a combination of S with a memory M, each immersed in the
environments ES and EM. The density matrix describing this combination must have –
after the environment has intervened – a form:
ρMS = TrESTrEMρMSEMES =
∑
p(i, j)PMi P
S
j , (11.1)
where p(i, j) must be nearly a Kronecker delta in its indices;
p(i, j) ≈ δij , (11.2)
so that the states of memory {PMi } can constitute a faithful record of the states of the
system.
One might feel that these statements are rather transparent and do not have to be
illustrated by equations. Nevertheless, the two equations above clarify some of the aspects
of the environment - induced decoherence and the emergence of the preferred sets of states
which were emphasized from the very beginning (Zurek, 1981; 1982) but seem to have been
missed by some of the readers (and perhaps even an occasional writer) of the papers on
the subject of the transition from quantum to classical. The most obvious of these is the
need for stability of the correlations between the preferred sets of states selected by the
processes of decoherence occurring simultaneously in the memory and in the system, and
the fact that memory is a physical system subjected to decoherence inasmuch as any other
macroscopic and, therefore, coupled to the environment degrees of freedom, open system.
The second point is somewhat more subtle (and, consequently, it has proved to be
more confusing): The form of the classical correlation expressed above by the two equations
precludes any possibility of defining preferred states in terms of the density matrix of the
system alone. The key question in discussing the emergence of classical observables is not
the set of states which are on the diagonal after everything else (including the memoryM)
is traced out, but, rather, the set of states which can be faithfully recorded by the memory
– so that the measurement repeated on a timescale long compared to the decoherence
time will yield a predictable result. Hence the focus on predictability, on the form of the
interaction hamiltonians, and on the minimum entropy production, and the relative lack
of concern with the states which remain on the diagonal “after everything but the system
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is traced out”. The diagonality of the density matrix – emphasized so much in many of the
papers – is a useful symptom of the existence of the preferred basis when it occurs (to a
good approximation) in the same basis. For, only existence of such stable preferred set of
states guarantees the ability of the to be classical systems to preserve the classical amount
of correlations. I shall not belabor the discussion of this point any further: The reader
may want to go back to the discussion of the role of the pointer basis in preserving some
of the correlations in measurements (Zurek, 1981; 1982; 1983), as well as to the earlier
sections where some of the aspects of this issue were considered.
Finally, the most subtle point clarified – but only to some extent – by the above two
equations is the issue of the perception of a unique reality. This issue of the “collapse
of the wave packet” cannot be really avoided: After all, the role of an interpretation is
to establish a correspondence between the formalism of a theory describing a system and
the results of the experiments – or, rather, the records of these results – accessible to the
observer. And we perceive outcomes of measurements and other events originating at the
quantum level alternative by the alternative, rather than all of the alternatives at once.
An exhaustive answer to this question would undoubtedly have to involve a model
of “consciousness”, since what we are really asking concerns our (observers) impression
that “we are conscious” of just one of the alternatives. Such model of consciousness is
presently not available. However, we can investigate what sort of consequences about the
collapse could be arrived at from a rather more modest and plausible assumption that such
higher mental processes are based on information processing involving data present in the
accessible memory. “To be conscious” must than mean that the information processing
unit has accessed the available data, that it has performed logical operations including
copying of certain selected records. Such copying results in redundant records: The same
information is now contained in several memory cells. Therefore, questions concerning the
outcome of a particular observation can be confirmed (by comparing different records) or
verified (by comparing predictions based on the past records with the outcomes of new
observations) only within the branches.
In a sense, the physical state of the information processing unit will be significantly
altered by the information-processing activity and its physical consequences – its very
state is to some degree also a record. Information processing which leads to “becoming
conscious” of different alternatives will result in computers and other potentially conscious
systems which differ in their physical configuration, and which, because their state is a
presently accessible partial record of their past history, exist in different Universes, or
rather, in different branches of the same universal state vector. These differences will be
especially obvious when the machinery controlled by the computer reacts to the different
outcomes in different ways. A particularly dramatic example of different fates of the
machinery is afforded by the example of Schro¨dingers Cat: The cat in the branches of the
Universe in which it is dead cannot be aware of any of the two alternatives because its
“machinery” was significantly modified by the outcome of the quantum event – it became
modified to the extent which makes it impossible for the cat to process information, and,
hence, to be aware of anything at all.
I believe that similar, but (fortunately) much more subtle modification of both the
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records and the identity – the physical state – of the recording and information processing
“observer” (animated or otherwise) are the ultimate cause of the “collapse”. This mech-
anism for the collapse is closely coupled to the phenomenon of decoherence, which makes
the changes of the machinery irreversible. The selection of the alternatives arises because
of the split into the machinery (including the memory and the information processing unit)
and “the rest of the Universe”, through the environment induced superselection. The pos-
sible set of alternatives of both “what I know” and “what I am” is then fixed by the same
process and at the same time. An observer carries in its state either an implicit or an
explicit record of its branch. It should be emphasized that these last few paragraphs are
considerably more speculative than the rest of the paper, and should be treated as such
by the reader.
The interpretation that emerges from these considerations is obviously consistent with
the Everett’s “Many Worlds” point of view. It is supplemented by a process – decoherence
– which arises when the division of the Universe into separate entities is recognized. Its
key consequence – emergence of the preferred set of states which can exist for time long
compared to the decoherence timescale for a state randomly selected from the Hilbert
space of the system of interest – is responsible for the selection of the individual branches.
As reported by an observer, whose memory and state becomes modified each time a “split-
ting” involving him as the system takes place, the apparent collapses of the state vector
occur in complete accord with the Bohr’s “Copenhagen Interpretation”. The role of the
decoherence is to establish a boundary between quantum and classical. This boundary is in
principle movable, but in practice largely immobilized by the irreversibility of the process
of decoherence (see Zeh, 1991) which is in turn closely tied to the number of the degrees
of freedom coupled to a macroscopic body. The equivalence between “macroscopic” and
“classical” is then validated by the decoherence considerations, but only as a consequence
of the practical impossibility of keeping objects which are macroscopic perfectly isolated.
I would like to thank Robert Griffiths, Salman Habib, Jim Hartle and Juan Pablo Paz
for discussions and comments on the manuscript.
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Figure Caption
Fig. 1. Predictability sieve for an underdamped harmonic oscillator. The plot shows
Trρ2 ∼ 1/area (which serves as a measure of purity of the reduced density matrix ρ)
for mixtures which have evolved from the initial minimum uncertainty wavepackets with
different squeeze parameters s in a damped harmonic oscillator with γ/ω = 10−4. Coherent
states (s = 1) which have the same spread in position and momentum, when measured in
the units natural for the harmonic oscillator, are clearly favored as a preferred set of states
by the predictability sieve. Thus, they are expected to play the crucial role of the pointer
basis in the transition from quantum to classical.
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Discussion
Halliwell: You have the nice result that the off - diagonal terms of the density matrix (i.
e. parts representing interferences) become exponentially suppressed in comparison with
the on - diagonal terms. But why does this mean that you have decoherence? Why is
it the peaks of the density matrix that matter? In short, what exactly is your definition
of decoherence? In the approach of Gell-Mann and Hartle, decoherence is defined rather
precisely by insisting that the probability sum rules are satisfied by the probabilities of
histories. These rules are trivialy satisfied, always, for histories consisting of one moment
of time. You seem to have only one moment of time. How is your notion of decoherence
reconciled with theirs?
WHZ: Very simply. I prefer to use the word “consistency” employed in the earlier work
to describe histories which satisfy probability sum rules (i. e. Griffiths, 1984) and adopted
by the others (Omne`s, 1990; 1992, and references therein).
I feel that the term decoherence is best reserved for the process which destroys quantum
coherence when a system becomes correlated with the “other” degrees of freedom, its
environment (which can include also internal degrees of freedom as would certainly be
the case for the environment of a pointer in a quantum apparatus). In spite of this
“conservative” attitude to the nomenclature, I am partial to the “decoherence functional”
Gell-Mann and Hartle have employed to formulate their version of consistency conditions.
This is because much of the motivation for their work goes beyond simple consistency,
and in the direction which, when pursued for open systems, will result in a picture quite
similar to the one emerging from the recognition of the role of the process of decoherence
(see Sections 8 and 9 above).
Now as for your other queries; (i) Decoherence is a process, hence it happens in time.
In recognition of this, the discussions of the effects of decoherence have always focused
on correlations and on the interaction hamiltonians used, for example, to define preferred
basis, rather than on the instantaneous state of the density matrix, which can be always
diagonalized. (ii) Consistency rules are “trivialy satisfied” at a single moment of time
because consistency conditions are always formulated in a manner which effectively results
in a “collapse of the state vector” onto the set of alternatives represented by projectors
at both the beginning and the end of each history. And applying a formalism which was
developed to deal with histories to an object defined at an instant is likely to be a bad
idea – and yield results which are either wrong or trivial. (iii) Nevertheless, the effect of
decoherence process can be studied at an instant through the insensitivity of the system
to measurements of the preferred observables. This insensitivity can be related to the
existence of classical correlations and seems to be a natural criterion for the classicality
of the system. It sets in after a decoherence time irregardless of the initial state of the
system.
Griffiths: The results you have discussed are very interesting, and add to our understand-
ing of quantum mechanics. On the other hand, I think that they could be stated in a much
more clearer way if you would use the “grammar” of consistent histories. For example, in
the latter interpretation the choice of basis is not left to the “environment”; it is a choice
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made by the theoretician. In fact, you choose the basis that interests you and, from the
consistent histories point of view, what you then did was to show that in this choice of
basis, and after a suitably short time, etc., the questions you want to ask form a consistent
history. But in order to think clearly about a problem, it is useful to use a clear language,
rather than talking about “fairies”, which is what one tends to do if one carries over the
traditional language of quantum measurement.
WHZ: I tend to believe that even though theoreticians have more or less unlimited pow-
ers, they cannot settle questions such as the one posed by Einstein in a letter to Born.*
Moreover, I find it difficult to dismiss questions such as this as “fairies”. Furthermore, I
feel rather strongly that it is the openness of the macroscopic quantum systems which –
along with the form of the interactions – allows one to settle such issues without appealing
to anything outside of physics.
I agree with you on the anticipated relationship between the consistent histories and
decoherence, and on the need to establish correspondence between these two formalisms.
I believe that they are compatible in more or less the manner you indicate, but I do not
believe that they are equivalent. In particular, consistency conditions alone are not as
restrictive as the process of decoherence tends to be. They can be, for example, satisfied
by violently non-classical histories which obtain from evolving unitarily projection oper-
ators which initially diagonalize density matrix. The relation between decoherence and
consistency clearly requires further study.
Leibowitz: I agree with much of Griffiths’ comment although I disagree with him about
“fairies”. I believe that all questions are legitimate and, as pointed out by Bell and fully
analyzed in a recent paper by Durr, Goldstein, and Zangi (J. Stat. Phys.,, to appear) the
Bohm theory which assigns complete reality to particle positions gives a completely clear
explanation of the non - relativistic quantum mechanics which is free from both problems
of measurement and from “having to talk to ones lawyer” before answering some of the
questions. Whether Bohm’s theory is right I certainly do not know, but it does have some
advantages of clarity, which should be considered when discussing “difficulties” of quantum
mechanics.
WHZ: I am always concerned with whether the relativistic version of the Bohm - de
Broglie theory can even exist. (How could photons follow anything but straight lines? Yet,
in order to explain double - slit experiments a la´ Bohm - de Broglie one tends to require
rather complicated trajectories!) Moreover, having grown accustomed to the probabilities
in quantum mechanics, I find the exact causality of particle trajectories unappealing.
* The quote from a 1954 letter from Albert Einstein to Max Born “Let Ψ1 and Ψ2 be
solutions of the same Schro¨dinger equation. ... When the system is a macrosystem and
when Ψ1 and Ψ2 are ‘narrow’ with respect to the macrocoordinates, then in by far the
greater number of cases this is no longer true for Ψ = Ψ1 + Ψ2. Narrowness with respect
to macrocoordinates is not only independent of the principles of quantum mechanics, but,
moreover, incompatible with them...” was on one of the transparencies shown during the
talk, quoted after the translation of E. Joos from New Techniques and Ideas in Quantum
Measurement Theory, D. M. Greenberger, ed., (New York Acad. Sci., 1986)
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Omne`s: Concerning the basis in which the reduced density operator becomes diagonal:
For a macroscopic system this question is linked with another one, which is to define
the “macrocoordinates” from first principles. My own guess (relying on the work of the
mathematician Charles Fefferman) is that one will find diagonalization in terms of both
position and momentum, as expressed by quasiprojectors representing classical properties.
WHZ: I agree with your guess and I can base it on the special role played by coherent
states in a quantum harmonic oscillator (as it is shown in Section 7 of the paper in more
detail), but I believe that decoherence is sufficient to understand similar spreads in position
and momentum. The symmetry between x and p is broken by the interaction hamiltonian
(which depends on position) but partially restored by the rotation of the Wigner function
corresponding to the state in the phase space by the self-Hamiltonian. I am, however, not
familiar with the work of Fefferman. Therefore, I cannot comment on your motivation for
your guess.
Bennett: If the interaction is not exactly diagonal in position, do the superpositions of
position still decohere?
WHZ: This will depend on details of the interaction, self-Hamiltonian, etc., as discussed
in the paper and references. It is, however, interesting to note that when the interac-
tion hamiltonian is periodic in position (and, therefore, diagonal in momentum) and the
particles are otherwise free (so that the self-Hamiltonian is also diagonal in momentum)
diagonalization in momentum (and delocalization in position) is expected for the preferred
states. Such situation occurs when electrons are traveling through a regular lattice of a
crystal, and the expectation about their preferred states seems to be borne out by their
behavior.
Hartle: I would like to comment on the connection between the notion of “decoherence”
as used by Wojciech in his talk and the concept of “consistent histories” discussed by
Bob Griffiths and Roland Omne`s that was called “decoherent histories” in the work by
Murray Gell-Mann and myself. As Griffiths and Omne`s discussed yesterday, probabilities
can be assigned to sets of alternative coarse - grained histories if, and only if, there is
nearly vanishing interference between the individual members of the set, that is, if they
“decohere” or are “consistent”.
For those very special types of coarse grainings in which the fundamental variables
are divided into a set that is followed and a set that is ignored it is possible to construct a
reduced density matrix by tracing the full density matrix over the ignored variables. Then
one can show that typical mechanisms that effect the decoherence of histories (as in the
Feynman - Vernon, Caldiera - Leggett type of models) also cause the off - diagonal elements
of the reduced density matrix to evolve to small values (see, e. g., my lectures, Hartle 1991).
However, the approach of the reduced density matrix to diagonality should not be taken
as a fundamental definition of decoherence. There are at least two reasons: First, realistic
coarse - grainings describing the quasiclassical domain such as ranges of averaged densities
of energy, momentum, etc. do not correspond to a division of the fundamental variables
into ones that are distinguished by the coarse - graining and the others that are ignored.
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Thus, in general and realistic cases there is no precise notion of environment, no basis
associated with coarse - graining, and no reduced density matrix.
The second reason is that decoherence for histories consisting of alternatives at a
single moment of time is automatic. Decoherence is non-trivial only for histories that
involve several moments of time. Decoherence of histories, therefore, cannot be defined
at only one time like a reduced density matrix. It is for these reasons that the general
discussion of decoherence (consistency) is important.
WHZ: I have a strong feeling that most of the disagreement between us that you outline
in your comment is based on a difference in our vocabularies. You seem to insist on using
words “decoherence” and “consistency” interchangeably, as if they were synonymous. I
believe that such redundancy is wasteful, and that it is much more profitable to set up
a one - to - one correspondences between the words and concepts. I am happy to follow
the example of Griffiths and Omne`s and use the term “consistency” to refer to the set
of histories which satisfy the probability sum rules. I would like, on the other hand, to
reserve the term “decoherence” to describe the process which results in the loss of quantum
coherence whenever (for example) two systems such as a “system of interest” and an “envi-
ronment” are becoming correlated as a result of a dynamical interaction. This distinction
seems to be well established in the literature (see, in addition to Omne`s, also Albrecht,
Conradi, DeWitt (in these proceedings) Griffiths (including a comment after DeWitt’s
talk), Fukuyama, Habib, Halliwell, Hu, Kiefer, Laflamme, Morikawa, Padmanabhan, Paz,
Unruh, and Zeh, and probably quite a few others). I see little gain and a tremendous
potential for confusion in trying to change this existing usage, especially since the term
“decoherence” is well - suited to replace phrases such as “loss of quantum coherence” or
“dephasing” which were used to describe similar phenomena (although in more “down to
earth” contexts) for a very long time. Thus, I am in almost complete agreement with
much of your comment providing that we agree to follow Griffiths and Omne`s and con-
tinue to use the word “consistent” when referring to histories which satisfy the sum rules.
And since you indicate that the two words can be used interchangeably, I assume that
you will not object to this proposal. Having done so (and after re-stating your comment
with the appropriate substitutions) I find only a rather minor items which require further
clarification.
The procedure required to distinguish the system from the environment is one of them.
You seem to insist on such distinction appearing in the fundamental variables (which,
I assume, would probably take us well beyond electrons and protons, to some version
of the string theory). I do not believe that such insistence on fundamental variables is
necessary or practical. Indeed, the questions addressed in the context of transition from
quantum to classical usually concern variables such as the position and momentum of the
center of mass, which are not fundamental, but are nevertheless coupled to the rest of
the Hilbert space, with the environment consisting in part of the “internal variables”. For
the hydrodynamic variables such split is accomplished by defining appropriate projection
operators which correspond to the averages (see, e. g., “Equilibrium and Nonequilibrium
Statistical Mechanics” by Radu Balescu, as well as papers by Zwanzig, Prigogine and
Re´sibois, and others). Similarly, in Josephson junctions (which motivated the work of
Caldeira and Leggett on the influence functional) the environment is “internal” and at
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least one of the macroscopic quantum observables (the current) is hydrodynamic in nature.
Finally, as to the question whether (1) decoherence and (2) consistency can be studied
at a single moment of time, I would like to note that: (i) Decoherence is a process, which
occurrs in time. Its effects can be seen by comparing the initial density matrix with the
final one. The corresponding instantaneous rate of the entropy increase, as well as the
discrepancy between the instantaneous density matrix and the preferred set of states can
be also assessed at an instant, as discussed in Section 7 above. (ii) I agree with you that
it is pointless to study consistency of histories which last an instant, since the first and
the last set of the projection operators are “special” and, in effect, enforce a “collapse of
the wave packet” (see Sections 8 and 9 for details), and instantaneous histories are rather
degenerate. Moreover, (iii) I could not find a better example than the last part of your
comment to illustrate why “decoherence” and “consistency” should be allowed to keep
their original meanings, so that we can avoid further linguistic misunderstandings and
focus on the physics instead.
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